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Technological Unemployment in the
United States: A State-Level Analysis
Courtney Krousie *
ABSTRACT. This paper aims to analyze the relationship between technological change and
unemployment across the United States. Building on previous research, I run a two-stage
least- squares regression that links technological change to unemployment. Technological
change is proxied with commercially-supplied research and development expenditures. I
acquire data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on unemployment rates and data from the
National Science Foundation on research and development expenditures from 2002-2013
for each state. Control variables include GDP, the minimum wage, education expenditures,
violent crime and property crime rates, union coverage, unemployment benefits, and
poverty rates. I find evidence that technological change displaces labor in the United
States, but the magnitude of the effect is small.

I. Introduction
"The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end
of the human race."
- Stephen Hawking
For centuries people have been worried about being replaced by machines
and left without work. These fears began during the Industrial Revolution
among textile workers and have continued today among all occupations.
This is an especially important concern because work is the main source
of income for the majority of people in the United States. If we are not
fully prepared for what may come, we may be left behind as we watch
robots take our jobs. At the moment this is all hypothetical. If we look to
the past we see that employment has continued to grow alongside
technological innovations, so why are some experts afraid that our jobs
will be replaced by robots? The recent exponential growth of technology
is the main reason. To see if this technological outburst is the beginning

*I would like to extend a sincere thank you to Dr. Bryce Kanago for his help with this
study. All remaining errors are my responsibility.
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of robots permanently taking our jobs, I will analyze the present
relationship between technological change and unemployment. After
running the regression, I found that technological change is displacing jobs
in the United States, though at present the effect is small.

II. Historical Background
The discussion of how technology affects unemployment dates back
centuries to the Industrial Revolution. During the period 1811-1816, there
was a group of English textile workers concerned about losing their jobs
to machines. Known as the Luddites, they protested by destroying weaving
machinery that would potentially replace their labor. Sharing their view
was Thomas Mortimer, an economic writer who opposed these machines
because they would "exclude the labour of thousands of useful workmen"
(Mortimer 1772, 72). Mortimer's idea that machines would directly replace
workers is known as the displacement effect.
Not everyone shared this entirely negative view of machines.
Economist Sir James Steuart recognized that machines could cause a man
to become idle temporarily, but the advantages of higher productivity
would be permanent (Steuart 1767, 122). Steuart addresses the
displacement effect, but also realizes that automation could actually
produce positive productivity growth, known as the productivity effect.
The Industrial Revolution showed that both of these effects existed. A
study by The Economist reported that during the 19th century, the amount
of cloth a single weaver could produce in an hour increased by a factor of
50 while the amount of labour required per yard fell by 98% (The
Economist 2016, 7). Cloth eventually became cheaper so the quantity
demanded of it increased, creating four times more jobs in the long run.
This case suggests that during the Industrial Revolution the displacement
effect was prominent in the short run, while the productivity effect took
over in the long run. Unlike the negative views of economists like
Mortimer, employment increased once workers were able to adjust to the
shock of the machines.
For some time after the Industrial Revolution, negative views toward
machines were rare. It was not until unemployment rates skyrocketed
during the Great Depression that machines again became the favored
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scapegoat. Like during the Industrial Revolution, there was some
disagreement about the extent to which machines were affecting
unemployment rates. On the negative side of this debate was eventual
commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Ewan Clague. He
stated the displacement effect would exceed the productivity effect so that
unemployment caused by machines would be large (Clague 1935, 210).
Clague thought the advantages of machines would be temporary while the
unemployment would be permanent. Other economists rejected the idea
that machines had an effect on unemployment. Edna Lonigan recognized
the displacement and productivity effects of machines, but said that
machines during the Great Depression had little if anything to do with
unemployment (Lonigan 1939, 255). It is important to realize that
technological change is a simple explanation for higher unemployment
rates, but this does not necessarily mean that machines are to blame.
It is no surprise that the debate over the extent to which technology
affects unemployment has continued well into the 21st century. The
current growth rate of technology is high and there is still unemployment,
so connecting the two is not a far reach. For example, since the
introduction of manual computing, which involved using machines such
as the abacus to do manual computations, computer performance has
improved by a factor of at least 1.7 trillion (Nordhaus 2007, 128). This
creates a strong incentive for businesses to substitute machines for workers
as machines are relatively more powerful, more reliable, and sometimes
less expensive than human labor.
As the power of machines increased, the number of tasks they could
perform without human interaction increased as well. As opposed to
weaving machinery that needed humans to operate, we now have
self-driving cars that can operate themselves. I will refer to these
autonomous machines as robots. These robots are the beginning of the new
threat for technology on unemployment: artificial intelligence. Artificial
intelligence involves giving machines the ability to imitate intelligent
human behavior. This involves tasks such as visual perception, speech
recognition, and decision-making. As soon as technology can do
everything that humans can do, especially without the flaw of human error,
there is no need for our labor. We have not reached this point yet, but we
should be prepared for what could happen once we do.
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Looking back at the Industrial Revolution, one would think the labor
force has nothing to worry about. The overall effects of weaving machines
were positive as they created four times as many jobs as they destroyed.
The McKinsey Global Institute warns that this time it's different.
Compared to the Industrial Revolution, technological change is currently
happening at roughly 3,000 times the pace (Dobbs, Manyika, and Woetzel
2015). Most of what we know from the past will not prepare us for what
could possibly happen to the unemployment rate in the near future.
Empirical studies that offer some insight on the relationship between
robots and unemployment are therefore of great value.

III.

Literature Review

There are many studies that look at the relationship between artificial
intelligence, or robots, and unemployment. In a survey done by Aaron
Smith and Janna Anderson of 1,896 experts, 48% believe that robots will
displace more jobs than they create by 2025 (Pew Research Center 2014,
2). The other 52% expect the displacement effect to happen, but as in the
Industrial Revolution, these experts believe the productivity effect will be
larger in the long run. One of the most well-known economists who has a
positive outlook on robots is Deirdre McCloskey. She states that if
technological unemployment were going to happen, it would have already
happened (McCloskey 2017). Further, she states that automation is good
and actually increases the quality of work. Others have also focused on the
quality side of robots replacing human labor, but of course no one can
seem to agree. Some economists recognize that not everyone will be better
off, although it is easy to assume that most people will be. Michele Loi
calls it the humanistic fallacy, which is the tendency to assume the
displacement of labor by robots will lead to most humans having better
jobs, but this is not always the case (Loi 2015, 202). Although this paper
will focus on how robots affect the quantity of work, it is important to
understand that this is not the whole issue.
Over the past five years, many empirical studies have been done to
quantitatively address how robots are affecting unemployment. Frey and
Osborne did a study that looked at how susceptible certain occupations are
to computerisation, and found that 47% are in the high risk category (Frey
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and Osborne 2013, 38). The results of their study may seem scary, but it
is important to note they only looked at entire occupations. The focus on
occupations is too broad, as each occupation contains tasks with different
risks of automation. Economists for the McKinsey Institute then completed
a study looking just at tasks, and found that up to 45% of tasks can be
automated by adapting currently demonstrated technologies (Chui,
Manyika, and Miremadi 2015). Their study found a large displacement
effect, but similar studies done later found a much smaller one. Following
the task-based approach, a study done by another group of economists
found that on average across 21 countries, 9% of jobs are automatable
(Arntz, Gregory, Zierahn 2016, 4). The large range of results found from
these studies shows how unsure we are about the strength of the
displacement effect. Regardless of the strength, the studies do show us
something important: the displacement effect does exist and some skills
are more vulnerable than others.
Some economists think the only way to survive in the labor force is to
focus on the skills in which humans have a comparative advantage over
robots. As Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee discuss in their book
The Second Machine Age, "there's never been a better time to be a worker
with special skills or the right education, because these people can use
technology to create and capture value" (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014,
11). These economists recognize that at present, the kind of tasks that
robots can do is limited. Even if robots substitute for human labor in
certain tasks, the remaining tasks completed by humans will be
complemented, according to David Autor. As an economic expert in this
area, he argues that inputs from both robots and humans play essential
roles, so improvement in tasks done by robots will almost certainly
increase the economic value of the human tasks (Autor 2015, 6). This
observation is basic economic theory, as giving workers more or better
capital increases labor's productivity. Focusing on specific tasks allows us
to look at ways in which, besides the productivity effect, humans can
directly benefit from robots. Now the question arises, are these benefits
enough to offset the displacement effect? I will address this relationship
with my model.
Looking generally at how unemployment is affected by robots, several
empirical studies have either shown no relationship or a small one between
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robots and unemployment. A recent study by economists Daron Acemoglu
and Pascual Restrepo found that the displacement effect, which tends to
cause a decline in the share of labor in national income, is counteracted by
the productivity effect, capital accumulation, improvements of existing
machinery, and the creation of new tasks in which labor has a comparative
advantage (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018, 32). The growth of robots, in
this instance, had no large overall effect on the rate of unemployment. A
year earlier, however, the same two economists did a study with a different
model and got different results. Using panel data between 1990 and 2007
in the US, they found that one additional robot per thousand workers
reduces the employment to population ratio by at least 0.18 percentage
points (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017, 35). This older study points to the
displacement effect being larger than the combination of the productivity
effect and any other benefits.
More common are studies that result in insignificant relationships
between robots and unemployment. In one study, three economists ran a
two-step generalized method of moments by using panel data from 25
European countries during 2000-2012 and found no significant
relationship between technological innovations and unemployment
(Matuzeviciute, Butkus, and Karaliute 2017, 7-10). A second study with
insignificant results was completed using panel data from seven Latin
American countries from 1996-2011 (Aguilera, Gabriela, and Barrera
2016, 63). The education expenditures variable used in their study will be
used for this paper and will be discussed later in greater detail. A third
study with insignificant results was completed by Yuqing Cang, who ran
a two-stage least squares regression using state-level data (Cang 2017, 12).
She used company-supplied research and development expenditures as a
proxy for technological innovation, which is what I will use in this paper.
I will also be following the regression model that she used in her study.
Out of all the studies I researched, I believe this model to be the best to use
because it is based on a study by Feldmann (2013). Feldmann ran a
regression on 21 industrial countries using panel data from 1985-2009, and
found patents, his technology variable, to have a significant positive effect
on unemployment in the short run, but found no long-term effect
(Feldmann 2013, 1120). This model is discussed next.
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IV. Model
The model used for this paper will follow the two-stage least squares
regression used by Feldmann (2013) and again by Cang (2017) in the
following form:
Second stage:

First stage:

UNEMPi,t is the unemployment rate of state i at year t, RD is the
research and development variable, and X is a vector of the independent
control variables. State fixed effects in the second-stage and first-stage
regressions are
and
, respectively. Year fixed effects are 8t and 6t
while the error terms are gi,t and 0 i,t. In the first-stage regression, the
research and development variable, RD, is instrumented to extract its
exogenous component. The instruments are the research and development
variable lagged over the previous four years. The research and
development expenditures of the previous four years are likely to have a
direct effect on the level of research and development in the current year,
and are also likely to affect the unemployment rate in the current year
(Feldmann 2013, 1116).
The independent variable RD is defined as domestic research and
development paid for by companies in the country and performed by the
companies. Also known as commercially-supplied research and
development, this variable will be in millions of dollars. I chose this as my
main independent variable of interest after reading studies like Cang's. She
found that commercially-supplied research and development is the best
proxy at present for technological innovation (Cang 2017, 12). As
discussed earlier, the relationship between robots and unemployment can
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either be positive, negative, or zero depending on the strength of the
displacement and productivity effects.
The first independent control variable, GDP, is defined as per capita
real GDP by state, chained to 2009 dollars. I chose this variable because
it proved to be statistically significant in the Latin America case (Aguilera,
Gabriela, Barrera 2016, 69). I predict the sign of this variable to be
negative, because as GDP increases the unemployment rate should
decrease.
The second independent control variable WAGE is defined as the
minimum wage of non-farm employment under state law measured in US
dollars. I chose this as another independent variable because it was another
one of the statistically significant variables in the Latin America case
(Aguilera, Gabriela, and Barrera 2016, 69). The expected sign of this
variable is positive, because as the minimum wage increases the
unemployment rate should also increase (Cang 2017, 21).
The third independent control variable EDUCATION is defined as
expenditures for public elementary and secondary education by state,
measured in thousands of US dollars. I chose this independent variable
because it was used in the Latin America study, and because some of the
literature says that education expenditures affect unemployment. The
expected sign of EDUCATION is negative, because as more money is
spent on education, the skills of the workforce should improve, leading to
lower rates of unemployment.
The fourth independent control variable VIOCRI is defined as offenses
of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. The fifth
independent control variable PROPCRI is defined as offenses of burglary,
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Both of these variables are
measured in the rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the state. I chose violent
crime as an independent variable because it was found to be significant in
Cang's study (2017, 43). Although property crime wasn't found to be
significant in her study, I still included it to see if it is significant now. The
expected sign of both of these crime variables is positive because as there
is more crime, there is likely more unemployment.
The sixth independent control variable UNIONCOV is defined as the
percent of employed workers who are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. This variable was found to be significant in Cang's study
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(2017, 43). The expected sign of union coverage is unknown, because it
was found to be positive in a study by Montgomery (1989) but negative in
Cang's study (2017).
The seventh independent control variable UNEMPBEN is
unemployment benefits, which are the benefit checks issued during the
calendar year, adjusted for voided checks and is measured in thousands of
dollars. This variable was found to be significant in Cang's study (2017,
43). The expected sign of the unemployment benefits variable is positive,
because as more benefits are paid, one would expect more people to be or
stay unemployed to receive these payments.
The eighth independent control variable is POVERTY which is the
percentage of people in poverty by state. This variable wasn't used in the
studies I looked at, but I included it because in theory the unemployment
rate should increase as there are more people in poverty. I expect the sign
of this variable to be positive.

V. Data
The data I collected is state-level data spanning the years 2002-2013. I
gathered monthly data on the unemployment rate from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics then used the data to calculate an average for each year by
state. Data on the independent variable RD was gathered from the National
Science Foundation. This study focuses on how robots are affecting the
unemployment rate, but there are no exact data on the introduction of
robots into a company. I chose domestic research and development paid
for and performed by companies as a proxy for technological innovation.
This is a better proxy variable than government funded research and
development because privately-funded research and development was the
only statistically significant variable in a study by Terleckyj (Terleckyj
1980, 376). It was also used in the Cang study.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis provided data on the independent
variable per capita real GDP by state. No alterations were needed for this
data. Information on the minimum wage independent variable was
gathered from the United States Department of Labor. A limitation of this
data is that some states had different minimum wages per year because
there was a lower rate set for companies with a small amount of sales. In
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these instances I used the average of the highest and lowest values. When
a state did not have any minimum wage data, I used the federal minimum
wage for that year. I then deflated the minimum wage by the consumer
price index for that year. Data on the independent variable public
education expenditures was gathered from the National Center for
Education Statistics. One limitation is that data on education expenditures
is calculated for a school year, not a calendar year like the other variables.
To make the data comparable, I assumed that expenditures during the
school year took place during the year that school began. For example,
education expenditures for 2002-2003 were used for 2002 and
expenditures for 2003-2004 were used for 2003.
Data on violent crime and property crime rates was gathered from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Data on union coverage was collected
from the Union Membership and Coverage Database created by Hirsch
and Macpherson, which is compiled from the monthly household Current
Population Survey. Information on the unemployment benefits was
collected from the Department of Labor, specifically the Employment and
Training Administration. Finally, data on poverty rates was collected from
the United States Census Bureau. Table 1 shows the summary statistics
information for all of the variables.
TABLE 1–Summary Statistics
Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

UNEM P

6.23622

2.087176

2.591667

13.60833

RD

4391.842

8575.412

21

76851

GDP

48548.99

18300.27

29056

170687

W AGE

3.012782

.4696426

1.230841

3.984157

EDUCATION

9536429

1.13e+07

716006.7

6.16e+07

VIOCRI

4-06.0613

215.6506

77.8

1632.9

PROPCRI

3162.598

812.4221

1619.6

6389.4

UNIONCOV

12.52042

5.467891

3.3

27.5

UNEM PBEN

798003.4

1100631

20753

1.06e+07

POVERTY

12.8884

3.360288

5.4

23.1
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VI. Results
Table 2 shows the results from the two-stage least squares regression. The
main variable of concern, research and development, is statistically
significant at the 1% level. There is a positive relationship, indicating that
as research and development expenditures increase, so does the
unemployment rate. Specifically, a one million dollar increase in research
and development will increase the unemployment rate by .0001. Although
the coefficient is small, this is evidence that the displacement effect is
larger than the productivity effect in the short-run. For the years and states
studied, I found that technological change displaced labor.
The control variables for GDP, unemployment benefits, poverty rates,
and education expenditures all have their expected signs. The first three
are statistically significant at the 1% level, and education expenditures are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Most of these variables have small
coefficients similar to the RD variable, but poverty has a larger coefficient
of .1109. This means that as the poverty rate increases by one percentage
point, the unemployment rate will increase by .1109 percentage points.
Another variable that has a large coefficient is the minimum wage. My
results show a coefficient of -.2556, which is different from the positive
sign that I expected. As the minimum wage increases by one dollar, the
unemployment rate falls by .2556 percentage points. This would suggest
that the minimum wage was below the market equilibrium wage for the
years studied. The violent crime variable also had a sign different from its
expected sign. The results show that as the violent crime rate increases by
one percentage point, the unemployment rate decreases by -.0021
percentage points. Previous studies had shown mixed results for this
variable relative to unemployment, so it was no surprise for me to get these
results. The variables for property crime and union coverage were not
statistically significant.
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TABLE 2–Regression Results
Variables

UNEMP

RD

.0001039***
(.0000382)

GDP

-.000149***
(.0000117)

W AGE

-.2555767**
(.1168916)

EDUCATION

-5.31e-08**
(2.54e-08)

VIOCRI

-.0021069***
(.0007224)

PROPCRI

-.0000328
(.0001164)

UNIONCOV

-.0202486
(.0253736)

UNEMPBEN

6.34e-07***
(8.44e-08)

POVERTY

.110887***
(.022701)

Constant

11.63618***
(.9439298)

W ald chi-squared
R-squared
Root MSE
Number of Observations

6576.66***
.9150
.60946
608

Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
***Significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level, and *significant at .10 level.

Krousie: Technological Unemployment in the United States

99

VII. Limitations
There are limitations to my study that should be addressed. The first is my
use of commercially-supplied research and development expenditures as
a proxy for technological change. This is not a perfect measure for
technological change, but it is one of the closest in terms of data currently
available to us. The research and development expenditures are an input
variable, meaning that a company may be spending a lot on research and
development that doesn't actually produce a product. Thus, spending on
research and development does not necessarily mean technological
innovation is happening. Better data for technological innovations would
improve future studies.
Second, there may be a spillover of research and development across
state lines. A company may spend on research and development in one
state to create a product in that state, but then the product is also used in
different states where the company operates. This could affect
unemployment in multiple states due to the spillover. Again, this is not a
perfect variable.
Third, my model is focused in the short-run and therefore doesn't offer
evidence for long-run results. I wanted to include an education
expenditures variable, but the data I could find only went back to 2002 so
doing a long-run focus would be difficult. Also, looking back at the results
from the Industrial Revolution, we weren't sure of the long-run results until
after a century passed. That being said, we may have to wait a century to
be able to analyze the long-run results of the technological change that is
happening right now.

VIII. Conclusion
Technological change has often made people worry about the future of
employment. With the new threat of artificial intelligence, their worries
are at an all-time high. Hoping to give people a clearer picture of the issue,
this paper analyzed the current relationship between technological change
and unemployment in the United States. I gathered data on the two main
variables of interest and included numerous control variables. Using a
two-stage least squares regression to estimate the results, I found a positive
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relationship between technological change and unemployment from
2002-2013. This shows the displacement effect is larger than the
productivity effect, so technology is directly displacing labor. It is
important to note, however, that the relationship during the period studied
was small. Although I cannot conclude this from the evidence I gathered,
I do hypothesize that the displacement effect will only get larger as
artificial intelligence advances. The labor force should start preparing for
the possibility that robots will replace their jobs.
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